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Abstract 
 
A growing body of national-level survey evidence indicates that small-scale 
entrepreneurial activity has been an important engine of growth in post-socialist 
economies.  Here we use a rich regional data set to obtain a statistical characterization of 
the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth within post-Soviet 
Russia.  Russia is a useful laboratory for evaluating links between entrepreneurial activity 
and growth because of the striking variation in initial conditions, the adoption of policy 
reforms, and entrepreneurial activity observed across its large number of regions in the 
early stages of transition.  Russia has also experienced striking regional variation in 
subsequent growth.  Conditional on variations in initial conditions and policy reform 
measures, we find that regional entrepreneurial activity exhibits a strong and enduring 
relationship with subsequent growth.   
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1. Introduction 
  A growing body of national-level survey evidence indicates that entrepreneurial 
activity is a critical source of growth in post-socialist economies. Entrepreneurs operating 
small businesses have managed to rapidly fill niches that were ignored under socialism in 
industries ranging from construction, trade, commerce, small-scale manufacturing and 
services. In many post-socialist cities, entrepreneurs have thrived even though their plants 
and equipment have been poorly protected; their contracts have been poorly enforced; 
their taxes have been high and the regulations they face have been burdensome; they have 
routinely been forced to make extra-legal payments to local mafias and government 
organs for protection; and they have had limited sources of external finance (Frye and 
Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2001).  
The view that entrepreneurial activity is an important engine of growth emerges 
from the observation that post-socialist economies that have experienced relatively robust 
patterns of entrepreneurial development have tended to enjoy relatively high rates of 
economic growth.  For example, synthesizing a large body of work focusing on the 
experiences of Poland, China and Russia, McMillan and Woodruff (2001) conclude that 
the robust economic growth enjoyed by Poland and China is attributable in large part to 
the substantial entrepreneurial development they have experienced, while the economic 
stagnation Russia has endured during its transition has as a root source its record of 
relatively sluggish entrepreneurial development.
1    
The positive experiences of Vietnam and Hungary, contrasting with the negative 
experience of Ukraine, provide additional examples.  Economic reforms implemented in 
Vietnam in 1986 led to the rapid resurgence of a virtually defunct private sector; seven 
years later small private firms servicing demands for clothing, footwear and manufactures 
such as metal- and wood-working accounted for an estimated 29% of national output 
(McMillan and Woodruff 1999; Ronnas and Bhargavi 2001).  Regarding Hungary, the 
relatively well-developed small-scale private sector that was in place prior to transition 
(operating primarily in manufactures, retail and trade) has also seen a substantial increase 
in market share during transition (Webster 1993; Kornai 2000).  In both cases, economic 
                                                 
1 Evidence on Poland is provided by Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski (2000) and Djankov 
and Nenova (2001); evidence on China is provided by Qian and Xu (1993) and Che and Qian 
(1998); evidence on Russia is provided by Richter and Schaffer (1996) and Broadman (2000).   2
growth has been robust during transition.  In contrast, the experience of Ukraine mirrors 
that of Russia: the development of its entrepreneurial sector has been limited, and it has 
suffered economic stagnation during transition (World Bank, 1999). 
   We complement these existing studies here by using a rich regional data set to 
obtain a statistical characterization of the relationship between entrepreneurial activity 
and economic growth within post-Soviet Russia.  Despite the relatively modest 
development of entrepreneurial activity experienced in Russia and the economic 
stagnation it has endured at the aggregate level, Russia provides an excellent laboratory 
for econometric analysis because it contains a large number of regions that exhibited 
striking variation in initial conditions, the adoption of policy reforms, and entrepreneurial 
activity in the early stages of its transition.  It has also experienced striking regional 
variation in subsequent growth.   
  The data we analyze cover 70 of Russia’s 89 regions.  To quantify entrepreneurial 
activity, we measure the number of legally registered small private enterprises in place in 
each region as of December 1995.  These enterprises consist of small-scale start-up firms 
and private spin-offs from previously state-run enterprises.  Growth is measured as the 
average annual growth in real per capita income observed between 1993:IV and 1997:IV, 
and between 1993:IV and 2000:IV (the former sub-period is analyzed for comparison 
with results we presented in Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002, which we discuss below).   
In our evaluation, we seek to account for factors that may have had a joint impact 
on entrepreneurial activity and growth.  We also seek to control for potential problems 
arising from the possibility that the entrepreneurial activity we measure in part reflects 
optimism regarding prospects for subsequent growth.  Given these concerns, we quantify 
a broad range of initial conditions and policy reform measures; the variables we use to do 
so predate our measures of entrepreneurial activity and growth.  Our analysis then 
proceeds in three steps.  First, we regress growth on the complete set of variables we have 
compiled.  The variables that fail to enter significantly in this regression at the 20% 
significance level are earmarked for use as instruments for entrepreneurial activity in the 
second step of our analysis; the remaining variables are withheld for exclusive use as 
conditioning variables in subsequent growth regressions.  Second, we estimate the 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and growth using a two-stage least-squares   3
procedure.  In the first-stage regression, we obtain a fitted version of entrepreneurial 
activity using the instruments identified in step one.  In the second-stage regression, we 
regress growth on the fitted version of entrepreneurial activity and the conditioning 
variables selected in step one; our conclusions regarding the relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and growth are based on this second-stage regression.  Third, we 
conclude by regressing entrepreneurial activity on the full range of additional variables 
we compiled.  We do this to evaluate the explanatory power of the variables that were 
excluded as instruments for entrepreneurial activity in the second step of our analysis. 
Our results indicate that regional entrepreneurial activity has had a strong and 
enduring relationship with growth.  Specifically, our estimates indicate that a one-
standard-deviation increase in regional entrepreneurial activity (reflecting an additional 
1.76 legally registered enterprises per 1000 inhabitants as of December 1995) is 
associated with an increase in real economic growth of 1.52 annual percentage points 
over the period 1993:IV – 1997:IV, and 1.07 percentage points over the period 1993:IV – 
2000:IV.  Among the variables we use as instruments for entrepreneurial activity, 
educational attainment (measured as the share of the regional population fifteen years old 
and higher that completed high school and received at least some post-secondary 
training) has the strongest explanatory power.  This finding is complementary to the 
results of Earle and Sakova (1999), who studied household-level determinants of 
entrepreneurship in post-socialist economies.  We also find that regions with relatively 
strong pro-reformist political orientations (measured as the share of the population that 
voted for pro-reformist candidates in the December 1993 parliamentary elections) 
experienced relatively robust entrepreneurial activity.   
Previous work of ours (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002) focused on the relationship 
between the regional implementation of policy reforms and subsequent economic growth 
within Russia.  Measuring growth over a subset of the regions considered here (48 rather 
than 70) and over a shorter time horizon (1993:IV – 1997:IV), we found a general pattern 
of indirect links between the implementation of policy reforms and growth, with 
entrepreneurial activity serving as a critical conduit.   This finding prompted the more 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between regional patterns of entrepreneurial 
activity and economic growth presented here.  The broader range of regions we are now   4
able to study, and the longer time period over which we can measure growth, leaves us 
better equipped to characterize this relationship while controlling for potential problems 
arising from simultaneity.  We proceed in the next section with a description of our data 
set; we then describe our estimation procedure and present our results in Section 3, and 
conclude in Section 4.   
 
2. Data Summary 
  Our data set contains regional measures of real income growth, entrepreneurial 
activity, initial conditions, and initial policy reform measures.  By “initial”, we mean 
measurements taken as close to the beginning of Russia’s transition period as possible.  
Most variables are measured as of 1993; none are measured later than 1994.   Our 
purpose in compiling initial measurements is to use them either as instruments for our 
measure of entrepreneurial activity, or as conditioning variables in growth regressions, 
thus the importance of obtaining measurements early in the transition process.   
The data set covers 70 of Russia’s 89 regions.  Most of the excluded regions are 
now-autonomous Oblasts, Okrugs and Krais that were part of then-conglomerate regions 
early in Russia’s transition process, and thus for whom separate measurements of 
“initial” variables are unavailable.  The war-torn Chechen Republic is also excluded for 
lack of data. The 70 regions covered in our data set represent all eleven of Russia’s 
geographic territories.  
 
2a. Growth and Entrepreneurship 
  We measure economic growth by computing the real purchasing power of income 
per capita at three dates (1993:IV, 1997:IV, and 2000:IV), and then computing the 
average annual growth rate observed between 1993:IV and 1997:IV, and between 
1993:IV and 2000:IV (source: unpublished Goskomstat data).  We denote these measures 
as GROWTH. 
  To measure entrepreneurial activity (denoted as ENT), we use the regional 
registry of small private enterprises per thousand inhabitants as of December 31, 1995 
(source: Goskomstat Rossii, 1996).  These enterprises are comprised primarily of legally 
registered start-ups and small spin-offs from former state-owned enterprises that first   5
began to emerge in the Former Soviet Union during the perestroika reforms in the late 
1980s (Aslund, 1997).  This measure provides an accurate characterization of overall 
regional entrepreneurial activity, since as noted in the introduction, the bulk of legal 
entrepreneurial activity in Russia has been concentrated in small start-ups and spin-offs.  
Ideally, we would work with an earlier measure of this activity to reduce potential 
problems associated with simultaneity, but accurate and consistent measures do not exist 
prior to this date (Aslund, 1997).   This lack of prior data availability serves as the 
primary motivation for the 2SLS estimation procedure we employ in Section 3.   
As Table 1 indicates, Russia has experienced substantial variation in economic 
growth and entrepreneurial activity.  Through 1997, the average annual regional growth 
rate was 1.46%, and the standard deviation of was 4.75 percentage points.  Average 
growth through 2000 fell to –7.31%, with a standard deviation of 3.25 percentage points. 
One reason for this striking drop is the financial crisis Russia suffered in August of 1998. 
Regarding ENT, it ranges from a low of 1.71 (enterprises per thousand inhabitants) in the 
Kursk Oblast to 16.61 in Moscow; its average is 4.19, and its standard deviation is 2.29.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
2b. Initial Conditions 
  We control for six initial conditions that summarize regional population, 
industrial and locational characteristics.  Regarding population characteristics, one 
variable we consider is the share of the population fifteen years old and higher as of 1994 
that completed high school and received at least some post-secondary training (EDU).  
This variable was collected in the 1994 Russian household micro-census (Goskomstat, 
1995).  Second, we consider the initial reformist orientation of the population (REF), 
which is measured as the share of the population that voted for pro-reformist candidates 
in the December 1993 parliamentary elections (source: Clem and Craumer, 1993).  Third, 
we measure regional initial standards of living (INITIAL) by computing the average ratio 
of money income per capita to the cost of a uniform basket of 25 food goods during 
1993:IV (source: unpublished Goskomstat data).  Because there are striking price 
differentials for similar goods within Russia, it is important to convert initial per capita 
incomes to a purchasing-power measure that is comparable across regions.  The 
purchasing power of per capita money income in terms of food is an attractive measure   6
because food purchases accounted for more than half of household expenditures in the 
1990s (Goskomstat 2000, p.167), and we have a uniform measure of a food basket that 
covers all of Russia’s regions; 1993:IV marks the earliest date for which comprehensive 
food-basket prices and household money-income data are available.  
  We use two variables to quantify initial regional industrial characteristics.  The 
first is a measure of initial production potential (IO); the second is a measure of the 
regional importance of the defense industry (DEFENSE).  To compute IO for a given 
region, we multiplied the industry’s labor share (source: Gaddy, 1996) by its value added, 
net of labor costs (this is the intermediate shadow-profit rate based on world-market 
prices and computed by Senik-Leygonie and Hughes, 1992); we then summed the 
resulting products.  This measure is limited to industries that produce tradable goods, and 
is meant to quantify the competitiveness of a region’s industrial structure on world 
markets prior to transition. The oil and gas industries have the highest value added, while 
food processing has the lowest (in fact, negative) value added.  DEFENSE is measured in 
each region as the number of workers employed in the defense industry per thousand 
employed workers in 1985 (source: Gaddy, 1996).  As emphasized by Gaddy (1996), 
DEFENSE is a potentially important conditioning variable since the defense industry 
served as a significant attractor of skilled workers, and gave regional elites close 
connections to powerful defense industries it Moscow.  Moreover, the defense industry 
continues to be an important and relatively stable sector in Russia’s otherwise chaotic 
industrial environment. 
  Finally, in order to take into account the potential impact of location, we measure 
the log of a region’s transport distance from Moscow (LNDIST).  Moscow was the major 
source of commercial, political, transport, cultural, educational, and financial activity in 
the Former Soviet Union, and still continues to command this important status within 
Russia.  Thus, transport distance is a potentially useful measure of a particular region’s 
access or lack thereof to critical activity within Russia. 
As Table 1 indicates, we generally observe substantial regional variation in these 
measures of initial conditions.  For example, the voting shares quantified under REF 
range from 13% (Dagestan) to 61% (St. Petersburg), with a mean of 33.3% and standard   7
deviation of 10.16%.  EDU is somewhat exceptional in this regard: it is relatively tightly 
dispersed, with a mean of 13.73% and a standard deviation of only 3.69%.   
 
2.3. Initial Policy Implementation 
  We use two variables to quantify regional variations in the implementation of 
policy reforms early in Russia’s economic transition: the extent of small- and large-scale 
privatization.  As background, the transition began in January 1992 with the 
implementation of rapid price, trade and financial-market liberalization initiatives.  
Privatization began in 1993, when the government allocated all state-owned enterprises to 
the property funds operated by the federal government, and the governments located in 
Russia’s 89 regions (including the primary regional governments, and the subordinate 
local governments in cities, city districts, settlements, etc.).  Local governments typically 
gained control over small shops and enterprises that operated in trade and retail markets, 
and sold off these enterprises for cash in the small-scale privatization program.  The 
federal government obtained control over the larger state enterprises in sectors such as 
manufacturing, heavy industry, energy and communications. The federal government was 
then instructed to work with relevant regional governments to form a plan consistent with 
the dictates of the large-scale privatization program.  In a successful large-scale 
privatization, the federal government and associated regional governments sold off 
ownership shares to insiders at a discount, and then allowed groups of outside investors 
to purchase equity in the enterprise using vouchers.  The vouchers were equity claims 
that that Russian federal government had issued to its entire population before proceeding 
with the privatization.  
We measure small- and large-scale privatization (SPRIV and LPRIV) using the 
number of enterprises privatized by local and federal governments in 1993 per thousand 
inhabitants in each region (source: Goskomstat, 1994).  These measures exhibit 
substantial regional variation.  For example, while the secessionist Republics of 
Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan had no large privatizations in 1993, Magadan, 
Tyumen, Ivanovo and Pskov Oblasts rapidly privatized their large state enterprises.  As 
reported in Table 1, the (mean, standard deviation) of SPRIV is (0.20, 0.12), and for 
LPRIV is (0.05, 0.04).   8
From a theoretical perspective, the prospective empirical relationship between 
privatization, entrepreneurial activity and economic growth is unclear.  In their influential 
book on Russia’s reform, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) argue that an immediate 
and massive privatization of state-owned enterprises would provide an incentive to local 
and regional governments to support market reforms because they would receive 
revenues from sales.  Moreover, rapid privatization of large enterprises would make 
reform irreversible because politicians would not be able to use these enterprises to 
promote their political objectives.  Thus rapid privatization would be good for 
entrepreneurship because politicians would no longer have an incentive to harass new 
small businesses in an effort to protect state enterprises.  However, Kornai (1990, 2000) 
and Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) argue that the discounted ownership 
positions and privileged access made available to insiders in Russia (workers and 
mangers in enterprises undergoing privatization) encouraged politicians and insiders to 
collude in an effort to gain privatization rents.  A potential manifestation of this collusion 
is that local politicians would have an incentive to harass small-scale entrepreneurs 
competing with the large privatized enterprises.  Boycko et al. (1995) also argue that the 
efficiency gains from privatization would enhance growth, while Kornai (1990, 2000) 
and Black et al. (2000) argue that insider privatization creates a corrupt environment that 
potentially inhibits growth.  
 
3.  Results 
As noted, our analysis of the relationship between small private enterprise 
formation and growth is based on two measures of regional growth: that observed 
between 1993:IV and 1997:IV; and that observed between 1993:IV and 200:IV.  In part, 
we consider the former measure to illustrate how our 70-region analysis compares with 
our previous 48-region analysis (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002).  Also, we are interested 
in learning whether the relationship between small private enterprise formation and 
growth has changed appreciably over time.   
In examining this relationship, there is clearly a need to guard against problems 
arising from potential simultaneity.  Thus our analysis is based on a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation procedure in which we use as instruments for small private   9
enterprise formation a subset of the variables introduced above that quantify regional 
differences in initial conditions and reform policies.  Although each variable seems to 
qualify as a valid instrument a priori, we only use a subset of the variables as instruments 
in the analysis presented below to guard against the possibility of over-fitting small 
private enterprise formation in our first-stage regression.  Of course, the use of only a 
subset of available instruments entails a certain loss of efficiency.  As we note below, 
results obtained using the full set of instruments indicate a somewhat stronger link 
between small private enterprise formation and growth than do the results we report in 
full here; footnote 3 provides details. 
We begin by selecting the instruments to be used for small private enterprise 
formation.  This is done by regressing growth measured through 1997:IV on each of the 
additional variables included in our data set.  To be conservative, variables whose 
coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 20% level in this regression are selected 
as instruments in our two-stage procedure.  OLS estimates of this regression are reported 
in Table 2.  (Standard errors reported throughout the paper are heteroskedasticity 
consistent, following White, 1980.)  The R
2 statistic we obtain in this regression is 0.476, 
indicating that our variables have reasonable explanatory power in accounting for 
regional variations in growth.  Four initial variables are statistically significant at the 5% 
level: INITIAL, IO, DEFENSE, and REF.  Each is also significant quantitatively.  To 
characterize quantitative significance, we report in the seventh column of the table the 
impact on annual growth of a one-standard-deviation increase in each of the independent 
variables.  For the four statistically significant variables, this impact ranges from 0.757 
(INITIAL) to 1.235 (REF) annual percentage points.  The estimated quantitative 
significance of ENT is also substantial (1.008), but this estimate is of course potentially 
tainted by simultaneity bias, and the 2SLS estimates reported below assign much greater 
quantitative significance to ENT than does this estimate.  Finally, the remaining initial 
variables (EDU, LNDIST, LPRIV, and SPRIV) are statistically insignificant, and are thus 
chosen as instruments in our 2SLS analysis.
2 
                                                 
2 P values associated with the individual t statistics for these variables are no lower than 0.294 
(EDU), and the c
2(4) test of the joint insignificance of these variables yields a test statistic of 
2.395, which has a p value of 0.664.   10
The application of our 2SLS analysis to growth measured through 1997:IV is 
presented in Table 3.  The first-stage regression of ENT on (EDU, LNDIST, LPRIV, and 
SPRIV) produces an R
2 statistic of 0.589, despite the fact that only EDU is significant 
either statistically or quantitatively.  Second-stage estimates were obtained by regressing 
GROWTH on the fitted version of ENT and the variables identified as statistically 
significant in the growth regression reported in Table 2 (INITIAL, IO, DEFENSE, and 
REF).  Note, then, that the variables used as first-stage instruments were excluded from 
the second-stage growth regression: these exclusion restrictions serve to identify the 
model.  To evaluate the validity of these restrictions, we added each instrumental variable 
to the list of explanatory variables in the second-stage regression, one at a time, and re-
estimated the model.  In no case did the included instrument turn out to be statistically 
significant at the 20% level in the re-estimated growth regression, thus the exclusion 
restrictions seem valid empirically.   
As Table 3 indicates, each variable included in the second-stage growth 
regression is statistically significant at the 5% level, and is quantitatively significant as 
well.  Notably, a one-standard-deviation increase in small private enterprise formation 
corresponds with 1.52 percentage point increase in annual growth.  While non-trivial, this 
figure is substantially lower than the estimate of 2.19 obtained in the 48-region analysis 
of Berkowitz and DeJong (2002).  However, this difference is due in large part to our use 
in this analysis of a relatively limited set of instruments, a point we return to in footnote 3 
below.  The quantitative significance of the remaining variables ranges from 0.824 
(DEFENSE) to 1.453 (REF). 
Next, we apply our 2SLS analysis to growth measured through 2000:IV; these 
results are reported in Table 4.  (The first-stage regression is precisely that reported in 
Table 3, and is not replicated in Table 4.).  Two versions of the second-stage growth 
regression are reported in this case.  Version 1 was obtained using the same set of 
exclusion restrictions employed in Table 3.  However, in this case when we sequentially 
augmented this regression to include each of the excluded instruments (again, one at a 
time), the coefficients on LPRIV and SPRIV each turned out to be significant at the 20% 
level individually.  Thus we also report in Table 4 a second version of the model that 
includes these additional variables as regressors.     11
Comparison of the estimates obtained using Version 1 of the model with their 
counterparts reported in Table 2 obtained using growth measured through 1997:IV yields 
the following observations.  First, the statistical and quantitative significance of INITIAL 
is no longer evident measuring growth through 2001:IV: the regional divergence in 
income observed through 1997 seems to have been subsequently reversed.  A similar 
reversal is found for DEFENSE.  Second, the significance of IO is virtually unchanged 
across time periods (its measure of quantitative significance drops only slightly, from 
0.907 to 0.851).  Finally, REF and NEWENT remain statistically significant, although 
their quantitative significance is lower over the longer time horizon (REF’s measure falls 
from 1.453 to 0.695; NEWENT’s falls from 1.522 to 1.03).  
The estimates obtained using Version 2 of the growth equation are similar to 
those obtained using Version 1 in most respects, although some differences are worth 
noting.  With the exception of INITIAL, the statistical and quantitative significance of the 
variables included in both specifications are roughly comparable (e.g., the quantitative 
significance measure obtained for NEWENT is 1.074 in this case).  The coefficient on 
INITIAL roughly doubles under Version 2, but remains statistically insignificant (with a 
p value of 0.6).  The addition of LPRIV and SPRIV under Version 2 yields an increase in 
R
2 from 0.279 to 0.321, and their coefficients are marginally significant both statistically 
(corresponding p values are 0.221 and 0.155) and quantitatively (-0.432 and –0.374).   
A clear picture that emerges from this analysis is that the regional pattern of small 
private enterprise formation that had been established in Russia by the mid-1990s has had 
a substantial and enduring relationship with subsequent economic growth.  It is therefore 
of considerable interest to understand how regional variations in the adoption of policy 
reforms may have influenced small private enterprise formation.  Since our measures of 
policy reforms were compiled very early in Russia’s transition, we can offer only a 
limited but revealing characterization of this influence here.   
As noted, we conducted the preceding 2SLS analysis using a limited subset of 
instruments in order to avoid over-fitting small private enterprise formation in the first 
stage.  In Table 5, we present an OLS regression of small private enterprise formation on 
the entire set of initial and policy variables in order to provide a better characterization of 
the importance of these variables.  Comparing the first-stage estimates reported in Table   12
3 with the estimates in Table 5, the inclusion of the full set of variables yields an increase 
in the R
2 statistic by 10 percentage points (from 0.589 to 0.689).  Of the four variables 
excluded in the original new-enterprise regression, only DEFENSE enters the augmented 
regression insignificantly.  The quantitative significance of the remaining previously 
excluded variables are as follows: one-standard-deviation increases in IO, INITIAL and 
REF correspond with -0.27, 0.482, and 0.596 additional new enterprises per thousand 
inhabitants. The quantitative significance of LPRIV and SPRIV is once again modest in 
the augmented regression, and each remains statistically insignificant.  Finally, the strong 
link between EDU and ENT remains evident here, as illustrated by the quantitative 
significance measure of 1.229.
3 
In sum, it appears that regions with relatively well-educated citizens sympathetic 
to the adoption of economic reforms have enjoyed relatively high levels of small private 
enterprise formation, which has exhibited a strong and lasting relationship with economic 
growth.  We have found little direct evidence here that privatization activity has had 
substantive economic effects, but since our measures of these activities were compiled in 
an early stage of the transition process, caution should be taken in basing general 
conclusions on this finding (see Berkowitz and Holland, 2001, for a broader exploration 
of the impact of privatization activity on small enterprises).   
 
4.  Conclusion 
Exploiting the rich regional variation in entrepreneurial activity and initial 
conditions that existed within Russia early in its transition, in addition to the regional 
variation in subsequent growth it has realized, we have found a strong and enduring 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and growth.  This intra-national evidence 
thus complements evidence of the importance of entrepreneurial activity for growth that 
has emerged from international comparisons of transitional economies.  The fact that we 
                                                 
3 Use of the fitted version of small private enterprise formation obtained in this unrestricted 
regression in the second-stage growth regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 yields systematically 
higher estimates of the quantitative significance of small private enterprise formation.  In Table 3, 
the estimate of 1.522 increases to 1.91 (thus comparing closely to the estimate of 2.19 obtained 
by Berkowitz and DeJong, 2002); in Table 4, the Version 1 estimate of 1.03 increases to 1.275; 
and the Version 2 estimate of 1.074 increases to 1.334.   13
observe such a strong statistical relationship in this case is particularly noteworthy given 
Russia’s relatively poor showing in these international comparisons.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Timing 
 
Average 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Growth   1993:IV-
1997:IV  1.46%  1.54%  4.75%  -8.18%  22.06% 
Growth   1993:IV-
2000:IV  -7.31%  -7.70%  3.25%  -14.63%  3.49% 
Small Private 
Enterprises 
Dec. 31, 
1995  4.19  3.87  2.29  1.71  16.61 
Education 
  1994  13.73%  12.70%  3.69%  9.20%  33.40% 
Initial  
Income  1993:IV  8.80  8.11  2.64  3.29  19.57 
Reformist 
Voting 
Dec. 
1993  33.30%  32.40%  10.16%  13.00%  61.00% 
IO 
  1985  5.11  7.19  14.45  -71.74  42.30 
Defense  
  1985  0.23  0.22  0.13  0.00  0.57 
Distance from 
Moscow (ln)    7.04  7.07  1.37  0.00  9.37 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  1993  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.16 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  1993  0.20  0.20  0.12  0.00  0.78 
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Table 2: Growth Regression, OLS 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
 
 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Constant  -10.840  3.931  -2.757  0.006  0.000  0.000 
Initial Income  0.286  0.132  2.165  0.030  2.643  0.757 
IO  0.066  0.030  2.191  0.028  14.446  0.953 
Defense  0.064  0.031  2.067  0.039  12.930  0.828 
Education  0.229  0.218  1.049  0.294  3.695  0.847 
Distance (ln)  -0.093  0.352  -0.265  0.791  1.375  -0.128 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  -1.279  11.593  -0.110  0.912  0.036  -0.046 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  -1.708  3.170  -0.539  0.590  0.118  -0.202 
Reformist Voting  0.122  0.053  2.310  0.021  10.163  1.235 
Small Private 
Enterprises   0.440  0.307  1.435  0.151  2.290  1.008 
R
2: 0.476             
 
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (White, 1980).  “Quantitative 
Significance” indicates the estimated impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
indicated independent variable on the dependent variable.  The c
2(4) test of the joint 
insignificance of the coefficients on Education, Distance, and Large- and Small-Scale 
Privatization yields a test statistic of 2.395, which has a p value of 0.664. 
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Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates, Growth Measured Through 1997 
 
 
 
Small Private-Enterprise (ENT) Regression 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
Quantitative 
Significance 
 
Constant  -1.515  1.269  -1.195  0.232  0.000  0.000 
 
Education  0.458  0.063  7.299  0.000  3.695  1.693 
Distance 
(ln)  -0.127  0.161  -0.786  0.432  1.375  -0.174 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  4.873  7.373  0.661  0.509  0.036  0.175 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  0.337  1.981  0.170  0.865  0.118  0.040 
R
2: 0.589             
 
 
 
 
Growth Regression, 1993 - 1997 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
 
 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Constant  -11.778  1.937  -6.081  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Initial Income  0.349  0.112  3.112  0.002  2.643  0.924 
IO  0.063  0.029  2.175  0.030  14.446  0.907 
Defense  0.064  0.031  2.030  0.042  12.930  0.824 
Reformist Voting  0.143  0.045  3.176  0.001  10.163  1.453 
Small Private 
Enterprises  
(fitted)  0.866  0.376  2.303  0.021  1.758  1.522 
R
2: 0.448             
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Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates, Growth Measured Through 2000 
 
 
Version 1 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T 
statistic  p value 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
 
 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Constant  -12.915  1.531  -8.435  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Initial Income  0.032  0.127  0.253  0.800  2.643  0.085 
IO  0.059  0.018  3.283  0.001  14.446  0.851 
Defense  0.013  0.027  0.476  0.634  12.930  0.164 
Reformist Voting  0.068  0.038  1.803  0.071  10.163  0.695 
Small Private 
Enterprises  
(fitted)  0.586  0.221  2.657  0.008  1.758  1.030 
R
2: 0.279             
 
 
Version 2 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
 
 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Constant  -11.934  1.514  -7.882  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Initial Income  0.067  0.127  0.525  0.600  2.643  0.176 
IO  0.057  0.018  3.110  0.002  14.446  0.820 
Defense  0.011  0.026  0.417  0.677  12.930  0.139 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  -11.995  9.790  -1.225  0.221  0.036  -0.432 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  -3.171  2.230  -1.422  0.155  0.118  -0.374 
Reformist Voting  0.065  0.040  1.620  0.105  10.163  0.662 
Small Private 
Enterprises  
(fitted)  0.611  0.202  3.019  0.003  1.758  1.074 
R
2: 0.321             
 
 
Note: The regression model used to obtain fitted values of small private enterprise 
formation is that reported in Table 2. 
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Table 5: Unrestricted Small Private Enterprise Formation Regression 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error  t statistic  p value 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Variable 
 
 
Quantitative 
Significance 
Constant  -2.284  1.532  -1.490  0.136  0.000  0.000 
Initial Income  0.183  0.100  1.819  0.069  2.643  0.482 
IO  -0.019  0.008  -2.230  0.026  14.446  -0.270 
Defense  -0.003  0.010  -0.270  0.787  12.930  -0.036 
Education  0.333  0.056  5.932  0.000  3.695  1.229 
Distance (log)  -0.228  0.135  -1.696  0.090  1.375  -0.314 
Large-Scale 
Privatization  5.726  4.848  1.181  0.238  0.036  0.206 
Small-Scale 
Privatization  -0.881  1.692  -0.521  0.603  0.118  -0.104 
Reformist Voting  0.059  0.019  3.138  0.002  10.163  0.596 
R
2: 0.689             
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